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ABSTRACT: As the United States moves toward health reform, it can glean important insights 
from other countries. Germany and the Netherlands, in particular, offer rich examples of approach-
es that could be applied to U.S. institutions. Both provide universal coverage within health systems 
that rely on competing insurance plans and largely private delivery systems. Both have used simi-
lar strategies to address issues and concerns, including insurance boards and exchanges to handle 
risk, set standards, and facilitate meaningful choice; all-payer payment mechanisms that ensure 
coherence and prevent undue use of market power; and information systems that inform payment 
and provide benchmarks to improve overall system performance. Using analysis from experts, as 
well as visits to both countries to study the systems, this report examines the system oversight and 
governance mechanisms in both countries to bring insights to the U.S. health reform debate. 
Support for this research was provided by The Commonwealth Fund. The views presented here are 
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cers, or staff. This and other fund publications are available online at www.commonwealthfund.org. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Both Germany and the Netherlands provide universal coverage within health sys-
tems that rely on competing insurance plans and largely private delivery systems. Each 
has been moving toward more competitive markets, with incentives and information to 
promote more effective and efficient care. To ensure that markets and competition work 
in the public interest of access, quality, and sustainable costs, the two countries have 
developed “rules of the game,” responsibility for which lies with quasi-governmental 
authorities with relative independence from their respective health ministries. Operating 
within broad legislative frameworks and accountable to elected officials, these authorities 
are designed to enable flexible, timely, and politically sheltered decision-making within a 
transparent and participatory setting.
While the evolution of the specific German and Dutch governance arrangements 
is tied closely to the unique history and culture in each country, the strategies seek to ad-
dress similar issues and concerns. Efforts have focused on three key areas: ensuring ac-
cess and fair competition in insurance markets; adopting payment and pricing policies to 
drive efficiency and stimulate system reforms; and instituting quality information systems 
to support innovation and value, including comparative effectiveness.
Both countries’ health systems provide insights for U.S. health reform by offering 
examples of key insurance, payment, and information strategies and ways to blend gov-
ernment oversight, stakeholder input, transparency, and markets to achieve public goals. 
Strategic policies implemented in both Germany and the Netherlands include: insurance 
exchanges; multipayer policies and group purchasing in the public interest; information 
systems to improve value and inform pricing; and public reporting with benchmarks and 
incentives for quality (Exhibit ES-1).
To ensure access and encourage fair competition, both countries operate insurance 
exchanges with market rules that focus competition on quality and total costs, and have 
processes that make it easy to choose, enroll, and stay covered in a plan. Both countries 
have developed a transparent process for defining the minimum benefit package and 
scope of coverage offered in the insurance exchange with an emphasis on access, value, 
and financial protection. Both countries also operate risk-adjustment schemes to provide 
incentives for plans to compete on quality, rather than enrollee selection.
ix
To focus payment policies on quality and costs, both countries seek to coordinate 
payment policies in their multipayer systems rather than leave these to each insurer act-
ing alone. This coordination ensures coherent price signals and policies for providers and 
enables group purchasing power in the public interest. In Germany, payment is largely 
determined by all-payer negotiations each year, while in the Netherlands cohesion is 
achieved through a set of shared payment policies with negotiations at the margins.
Finally, the countries have publicly supported information systems that focus on 
value and improvement. These include public reporting and feedback systems and com-
parative effectiveness research. These information systems seek to inform and drive qual-
ity improvement and support robust, well-functioning markets.
A central question in the current U.S. health reform debate is how to harness mar-
kets to produce results in line with the public interests of access, quality, and affordable 
costs. Assuming the U.S. insurance system will retain some form of a multipayer ap-
proach, success in addressing these goals will likely hinge on the design of mechanisms 
that foster and support more efficient and effective markets with coherent payment and 
information systems. Germany and the Netherlands offer important insights for how to 
structure and oversee the implementation of health reform in the United States.
Exhibit ES-1. Key German and Dutch Policies for a Multipayer 
System, with Insights for U.S. National Reforms 
• Insurance Markets 
–Insurance exchanges with insurance market rules/reforms 
–Prohibition on health risk rating; community rating 
–Value-based insurance benefit design and pricing 
–Risk equalization 
• Payment coordination and use of group purchasing 
power in public interest 
• Comparative effectiveness to inform value and prices 
• Public reporting, benchmarks, and incentives for quality 
xElements of the German and Dutch systems offer rich examples of approaches 
that, if tailored to U.S. institutions, could work in the United States. These include: insur-
ance boards and exchanges to handle risk, set standards, and facilitate meaningful choice; 
all-payer payment mechanisms that ensure coherence and prevent undue use of market 
power; and information systems that inform payment and provide benchmarks to improve 
overall system performance. Just as the German and Dutch governance approaches have 
evolved within unique historical and cultural contexts, progress in the U.S. will also need 
to reflect our own unique starting point and key concerns. Yet, these core elements are 
likely central to harnessing U.S. markets for the public interest in an accessible, high-
quality, affordable, and dynamic U.S. health system.
1HARNESSING HEALTH CARE MARKETS FOR THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: INSIGHTS FOR U.S. HEALTH REFORM FROM THE 
GERMAN AND DUTCH MULTIPAYER SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
Within the U.S. health reform debate, policymakers are assessing strategies that would 
build on a multipayer insurance system and use payment and information reforms to 
improve quality and bend the nation’s cost curve to achieve a more sustainable health 
system. A central question is how to move forward and harness a competitive market that 
acts in the public interest to foster better access, quality, and value. Assuming the U.S. 
retains a multipayer approach, success in addressing these goals will likely hinge on the 
design of mechanisms that foster and support more efficient and effective markets with 
coherent payment and information systems.
In creating the types of rules and oversight mechanisms that could make markets 
work in the public interest, the United States can look to other countries for insights and 
examples. This report examines the evolution of approaches used in Germany and the 
Netherlands to govern and oversee health care systems and markets. Both countries pro-
vide universal coverage within systems that rely on competing health insurance plans and 
largely private, community-based delivery systems. Each has been moving toward more 
competitive markets, with incentives and information to promote more effective and effi-
cient care. To focus markets and competition on better access, quality, and value, the two 
countries have evolved a set of “rules of the game” and relatively independent quasi-gov-
ernmental authorities. Operating within broad legislative frameworks, the authorities are 
designed to facilitate policy implementation, enable decision-making with participation, 
and foster collaboration, as well as competition.
Although the German and Dutch authorities have evolved to fit their unique health 
systems and history, they address issues and concerns that apply generally to competitive 
markets, including a need for ongoing adjustments. To provide insights for the United 
States, this report describes each country and its governance mechanisms, and examines 
crosscutting strategies and themes. Throughout, we focus on efforts that enable effective 
and efficient insurance, payment, and quality information systems. The concluding sec-
tion looks at implications and the potential for U.S. national reform.
2THE GERMAN AND DUTCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS:  
OVERVIEW AND GOVERNANCE
Country Overview: Performance
Germany and the Netherlands provide near-universal coverage (99% insured) at a cost 
far lower than the United States. As of 2007, U.S. per-person spending was nearly double 
German and Dutch spending, despite the fact that both insure everyone, including long-
term care coverage (Exhibit 1). The U.S. spends a far higher share of national resources 
(i.e., gross domestic product) on health care and the gap has been growing over time.
Compared with the United States, Germany and the Netherlands have more physi-
cians and hospitals per 1,000 population, and their populations average more visits per 
year to doctors. The higher U.S. spending per person despite lower use reflects a combi-
nation of higher prices and more intense and less efficient use of specialized resources. 
It also reflects much higher insurance administrative costs. Although Germany and the 
Netherlands also operate with multipayer insurance systems, their net insurance adminis-
trative costs per person are less than half the U.S. average—$190 to $198 compared with 
$516, as of 2007 (Appendix A, Table 1). The difference reflects higher U.S. marketing 
costs, complex benefit design and authorization rules, underwriting costs, and profit mar-
gins, as well as higher churning.1
Exhibit 1. International Comparison of Spending on Health, 
1980–2007
Average spending on health 
per capita ($US PPP*) 
Total expenditures on health as 
percent of GDP 
$7,290 
$3,837 
$3,588 
16.0% 
10.4% 
9.8% 
* PPP=Purchasing Power Parity. ** All 30 OECD countries except U.S.
Source: OECD Health Data 2009, version 06/20/09.
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3Despite spending less, Germany and the Netherlands often achieve equivalent 
or better health outcomes and care experiences. For example, in a composite measure 
of deaths before age 75 from conditions that potentially could have been prevented with 
timely and appropriate care, the U.S. lagged well behind both countries and has been 
improving more slowly as of 2002/2003 (Exhibit 2). The U.S. now ranks last among 19 
advanced, industrialized countries.2 Both Germany and the Netherlands have a longer life 
expectancy and their populations are less likely to die from heart attacks, cancer, lung dis-
ease, and diabetes. Both also achieve high rates of preventive care for adults and children 
(Appendix A, Table 2).
Based on 2008 patient experiences, Germany and the Netherlands also provide 
accessible care with far lower out-of-pocket costs and have lower rates of forgone care 
due to costs than experienced in the United States.3 Dutch patients are particularly notable 
for their rapid access to primary care, access to care after hours, low use of emergency 
rooms, and fewer instances of poorly coordinated care (Exhibit 3). In a 2009 survey of 
primary care physicians, Dutch and German physicians were far more likely than U.S. 
doctors to report arrangements for after-hours care and to have electronic information 
systems with the capacity to support chronic disease management and enhance prescrip-
tion medication safety. They were also much less likely to report cost- and insurance-
related access barriers for their patients.4
Exhibit 2. Mortality Amenable to Health Care, 2002/2003
U.S. Rank Fell from 15 to Last out of 19 Countries
*Countries’ age-standardized death rates before age 75; from conditions where timely 
effective care can make a difference including: diabetes, asthma, ischemic heart disease, 
stroke, infections, screenable cancer. 
Data: E. Nolte and C. M. McKee, “Measuring the Health of Nations,” Health Affairs, Jan./Feb. 
2008.
Source: Commonwealth Fund National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 2008.
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4Exhibit 3. Experiences of Chronically Ill Adults and Primary Care Doctors in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States
 
Germany 
(%)
Netherlands 
(%)
United 
States 
(%)
Chronically Ill Adults, 2008
In past 2 years:
Went without needed care because of costsa 26 7 54
Coordination problemsb 26 14 34
Medical, medication, or lab errorc 19 17 34
Spent more than $1,000 out-of-pocket for medical care in 
past year 13 8 41
Has regular doctor or place of care 99 100 91
Received same-day appointment last time sick, needed care 43 60 26
Somewhat/very difficult getting care after hours without going 
to the emergency room 36 30 60
Went to ER in past 2 years 39 26 59
Used ER for condition could have been seen by regular doc-
tor, if available 6 6 19
Wait for appointment with specialist, 2008
Less than 4 weeks 68 69 74
2 months or longer 20 25 10
Wait for elective surgery, 2007 General Population [Base: 
Adults with elective surgery past 2 years]
Less than 1 month 72 47 62
More than 6 months 3 2 4
Primary Care Physicians, 2009
Practice has arrangement for patients to see doctor or nurse 
after hours without going to ER 54 97 29
Practice uses electronic medical records 72 99 46
Practice information system has 9 or more of 14 electronic 
functions 36 54 26
a Because of cost, did not fill Rx or skipped doses, did not visit a doctor when sick, and/or did not get recommended test, treatment, or follow-up care.
b Test results/records not available at time of appointment and/or doctors ordered test that had already been done.
c Wrong medication or dose, medical mistake in treatment, incorrect diagnostic/lab test results, and/or delays in abnormal test results in past two years.
Sources: Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Surveys of Sicker Adults (2008), All Adults (2007), and Primary Care Physicians (2009).
5German and Dutch Health Systems: Markets and Recent Reforms
In recent years, both Germany and the Netherlands have looked to choice, competition, 
and markets to foster innovation and confront the cost challenge of meeting the needs 
of aging and chronically ill populations. Each has undertaken major health reform in the 
past five years—Germany in 2004 and 2007, the Netherlands in 2006—and both continue 
to make adjustments and incremental reforms to their systems. The principle of solidari-
ty—the aim of equitable access to high-quality, essential care for everyone—has guided 
the reforms of the German and Dutch health systems.
As a result of these reforms, Germany and the Netherlands currently rely on com-
peting insurance plans to ensure access and financial protection and to pay for care. In 
each country, residents have a choice of insurance plans. As described below, each coun-
try has implemented governance mechanisms that seek to manage the competition among 
insurance plans to focus on improving quality and efficiency of care.
Both countries pay providers through multiple payers. Their payment systems are 
evolving, with Germany moving away from fee-for-service to more “bundled” payment 
methods and the Netherlands moving away from central control toward more diverse ar-
rangements. As an integral part of market and competitive strategies, both countries are 
supporting public efforts to provide better quality information, including comparative 
assessment of alternative treatment choices and data to benchmark and compare perfor-
mance. In effect, both Germany and the Netherlands have instituted reforms that com-
prise core elements under consideration in the U.S. health reform debate, as well as over-
sight authorities to orchestrate and implement policies. The strategic policies in operation 
in both countries include insurance exchanges with strong insurance market rules and risk 
funds, coordinated payment policies and value-based pricing, and information systems.
Each of these systems can be viewed as a triangle—with a set of public laws, 
rules, or mechanisms helping to orchestrate interactions between patients, providers, and 
insurers (Exhibit 4). While the evolution of the specific German and Dutch governance 
arrangements is tied closely to the unique history and culture in each country, each coun-
try’s efforts to oversee insurance, payment, and information systems seek to address simi-
lar issues and concerns. Each uses quasi-governmental authorities acting in concert with 
each other to harness competition and foster collaboration between multiple key stake-
holders to stimulate innovations in the public interest. In developing authorities, both 
Germany and the Netherlands have sought to address the need for ongoing adjustment 
and incremental reforms.
6Germany: Country Context and Governance
Germany’s health insurance system builds on a more than 100-year-old structure of so-
cial insurance funds that operate through a set of federal, state, and corporate (employer/
labor) arrangements. Currently, the social health insurance system (in Germany called the 
statutory insurance system or SHI) covers approximately 90 percent of the German popu-
lation through roughly 190 competing health insurers, called “sickness funds.” Coverage 
is obligatory for most residents below a certain income level. High-income residents, 
civil servants, and the self-employed have the option to choose private or public cover-
age. About 10 percent of the population selects private coverage. This private insurance is 
governed by different rules and premiums may vary by age and health status (Exhibit 5). 
Starting in 2009, every German is mandated to have health insurance that covers at least 
the basic benefit package offered through SHI. Private insurers must offer open enroll-
ment, standardized benefits and participate in a risk-equalization scheme. About 0.5 per-
cent of those living in Germany are uninsured.5
As a group, the sickness funds negotiate payment with providers. These collec-
tive contracts operate within overall budgets each year. German patients generally have 
a wide choice of providers and hospitals. Sickness funds have the flexibility to contract 
with providers directly and vary patient cost-sharing provisions.
Exhibit 4. The Netherlands and Germany Health Care Triangle: 
National Leadership Central
Government 
Zorgaanbieders 
Care 
Providers 
Patients 
Insurers 
Choice  Choice  
  
Source: Adapted from presentations to AcademyHealth Netherlands Health Study Tour on 
Sept. 22, 2008, “The Position of the Patient and Healthcare Quality.”
• Insurance Market
• Payment
• Quality Information 
COMPETITION AND 
COLLABORATION
7The minimum German insurance benefit package is comprehensive, includ-
ing physician, prescription, hospital, and diagnostic services, as well as other benefits. 
Patients face cost-sharing for physicians, drugs, and hospital care, but it is low by U.S. 
standards. To protect against financial burden, standard benefits limit annual cost-sharing 
to 2 percent of income for the general population and 1 percent for those with chronic 
conditions.5
The insurance funds compete for enrollment: Germans can choose and switch 
among the sickness funds. The SHI system is financed through tax revenue and income-
based contributions shared between employer and employee. Beginning in 2009, employ-
ers contribute 7.3 percent of wages to sickness funds, while employees contribute 8.2 
percent of their income (Exhibit 6). As of 2009, all revenue is being pooled into a central 
federal health insurance fund.6 The fund allocates these revenues to sickness funds ac-
cording to a risk-equalization scheme based on age, sex, and health status of enrollees. As 
in the Netherlands, the goal is a risk-equalization system that together with payment re-
forms and strong quality measures will lead to a more transparent and competitive market 
focused on health outcomes and value.
Exhibit 5. The German Insurance System at a Glance 
Care 
Choice of insurance  Payment contracts, mostly collective 
negotiation
Source: Reinhard Busse, Berlin University and European Observatory. Presentation to 
The Commonwealth Fund, 2008.
Population Providers 
Social health insurance: 90% 
Private health insurance: 10% 
Public–private mix,  organized in associations 
ambulatory care/hospitals 
 
Delegation
 and limited 
governmental control  
Insurers 
Social insurance (~200 sickness funds) and private (~50) 
Choice of provider 
8Corporate Self-Governance Model
The German federal Ministry of Health is the highest federal government authority re-
sponsible for the health system. The ministry establishes the broad legal framework (de-
riving from Parliament legislation) and supervises the insurance system through concep-
tual guidelines or “decrees.”7,8 Oversight of insurance, payment, and information systems 
occur via a set of independent authorities, with participation of multiple key stakeholders 
(Exhibit 7).
Far-reaching structural reforms in 2004 (the SHI Modernization Act) created 
the Federal Joint Committee.9 The Joint Committee sets policies for the health system’s 
payers (sickness funds) and providers (panel physicians and most hospitals).10 The Joint 
Committee is composed of neutral, at-large representatives, and representatives from 
physician, hospital, and sickness fund organizations, and patients. The patient representa-
tives advise and participate but have no vote.
The Joint Committee wields a wide range of regulatory powers, which include 
overseeing the benefit package and payment policy parameters for Germany’s SHI sys-
tem. The Committee also issues directives regarding disease management programs and 
quality assurance that are binding for panel physicians, hospitals, sickness funds, and 
the insured population.11 Nicknamed the “small lawmaker” (with Parliament being the 
big lawmaker), the Joint Committee is Germany’s most authoritative central-level, self-
governance entity.
Exhibit 6. German Federal Health Insurance Fund: 2007 
 
 
Federal Health Insurance Fund 
Risk-adjusted
 payment per 
insured person
Insured member 
Sickness Funds 
8.2% 7.3% 
Employer 
contribution: 
wage-related 
Employee 
contribution: 
Income-related
Government
tax revenues
9Under the purview of the Joint Committee are the Institute for Quality and 
Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG)—established with the 2004 reforms—and the Federal 
Office for Quality Assurance.12 Each operates independently to provide information on 
comparative effectiveness (IQWiG) and comparative performance (Office for Quality 
Assurance), with specific criteria and range of authority.
Payment System
German sickness funds negotiate as a group with associations representing physicians 
and hospitals. These negotiations operate within broad budgets established by revenues 
collected for insurance funds. Historically, the negotiations were at the regional level or 
with provider groups, with separate negotiations for doctors and hospitals associations. 
More recently, negotiations occur across provider groups at a national level (Exhibit 8). 
The goal of the 2004 reforms was to improve cost control and reduce competition among 
provider groups.
Physicians in the outpatient sector are paid primarily through fee-for-service and 
generally work in small or solo private practices. Sickness funds annually negotiate ag-
gregate payments with regional physician and national organizations. These budgets will 
begin to account for variations in population health risks starting in 2009.
Exhibit 7. Oversight of the German Health Care System
 
• German Federal Ministry of Health: Legal framework, planning, 
supervision, accreditation, commissioning, and enforcement
• Federal Joint Committee: Core of self-regulatory structure
–composed of insurer, provider, and neutral 
representatives; patients participate with advisory role
–issues legally binding directives
–defines sickness fund benefit package
• Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare (IQWiG): 
Comparative/cost effectiveness
• Federal Health Insurance Fund: Risk equalization
• Federal Office for Quality Assurance: Hospital quality indicators, 
benchmarks, and feedback
10
Since 2004, hospitals have been paid through a diagnosis-related group system. 
Drugs are covered through a reference price system set by the Federal Joint Committee, 
with patient payments higher for more expensive medications when a lower-cost alterna-
tive exists.13 Manufacturers and sickness funds may negotiate rebates and discounts that 
vary from reference prices.
National negotiations have facilitated common fee schedules and incentive sys-
tems for chronic disease management for community-based physicians. Physician asso-
ciations manage total payments over the year within a budget. Physicians seeing privately 
insured patients may charge more. Such extra billing limits the charge to up to twice the 
negotiated fee in SHI contracts.14
Primary Care and Delivery System
Germany has historically operated a fee-for-service system for care in the community, 
with a broad choice of physicians, including self-referral to specialists. Reforms to im-
prove primary care and management of chronic conditions have introduced incentives 
for patients and physicians to place primary care in the center of care coordination. Cost-
sharing for specialist care is lower when patients are referred from their primary care doc-
tor and for those participating in chronic disease programs. Primary care practices receive 
extra payment for patients participating in such disease management programs.
Exhibit 8. Health System in Germany
Insurers 
Source: Richard Busse, “The Health System in Germany–Combining Coverage, Choice, 
Quality, and Cost-Containment,” PowerPoint Presentation, 2008. Updated April 13, 2009.
Federal Ministry of Health 
Patients 
Federal 
Association of SHI 
Physicians 
German Hospital 
Federation 
2,100 hospitals 
Federal Association 
of Sickness Funds 
Federal Joint Commitee (G-BA) 
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in 
Healthcare (IQWiG) (technologies) 
Institute for Quality (providers) 
Statutory Health Insurance 
Federal 
Physicians’ 
Chamber 
190 sickness funds 
150,000 
physicians and 
psychotherapists 
Regulation & supervision 
All 414,000 physicians 
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Historically, German hospitals were paid on a budget with a sharp line between 
hospital care and outpatient care in the community. Recent payment reforms seek to 
encourage more integrated care, including hospital-based outpatient capacity. Regional 
initiatives also offer more “bundled” payments that include specialized physician care 
during an episode of care.
The Federal Joint Committee as well as the Ministry set the overall policy frame-
work and promote policies to stimulate delivery system reform. These include develop-
ment of disease management programs and incentives to enhance the role of primary care 
practices in care coordination and referrals.
Information Systems
The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), the German compara-
tive effectiveness institute, is modeled to some extent after the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom. However, unlike NICE, 
which operates under government auspices, IQWiG is an independent, nonprofit institute 
charged with comparative assessment and recommendations, under priorities set by the 
Joint Committee.15 With a dedicated operating budget to ensure independence, IQWiG is 
responsible for the scientific evaluation of the benefits, potential risks, and comparative 
cost-effectiveness of health care services.16 IQWiG serves in an advisory capacity, in-
forming pricing and coverage decisions made by the Joint Committee. It also provides an 
independent source of information for clinicians and patients.17
Exhibit 9. National Quality Benchmarking in Germany
 
Source: C. Veit, "The Structured Dialog: National Quality Benchmarking in Germany,” 
Presentation at AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting, June 2006.
Ideas and goals: 
� define standards (evidence 
based, public)
�  define levels of acceptance
� document processes, risks 
and results
� present variation
� start structured dialog
� improve and check
Size of the project:
• 2,000 German hospitals (> 98%)
• 5,000 medical departments
• 3 million cases in 2005 
• 20% of all hospital cases in 
Germany 
• 300 quality indicators in 26 
areas of care
• 800 experts involved (national 
and regional)
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The Office for Quality Assurance is responsible for the development of clini-
cal performance measurement in German hospitals.18 This work includes feedback and 
benchmarking for 150 or more indicators and 30 conditions. The focus of the effort is on 
improvement (Exhibit 9). Since 2007, about 30 indicators have been publicly available in 
annual quality reports.
The Netherlands: Country Context and Governance
The health care system in the Netherlands is publicly regulated and privately delivered. 
The core policy strategy seeks to improve the health care system through managed com-
petition of insurance plans and providers. The current structure is the result of the land-
mark Health Insurance Act of 2006, which sought to maintain universal coverage while 
stimulating competition among insurers and providers on quality and value. The legisla-
tion unified the previous insurance system, which operated with required public insurance 
for middle- and lower-income Dutch residents and private insurance for higher-income 
residents, with the two insurance sectors governed by different market rules. Beginning in 
2006, all Dutch residents were required to purchase a standard health insurance package 
from competing private insurance plans. Previously public “sickness funds” converted to 
private status, with all health insurance plans operating under the same rules.
Exhibit 10. National Leadership Oversight Within 
the Dutch Health Ministry
 
• The Dutch Health Insurance Board: risk equalization fund 
and comparative effectiveness/benefits (acute and 
long-term).
• The Dutch Health Care Authority manages competition; 
prices and budgets; transparency.
• The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate supervises the quality 
of the care.
• The Dutch Competition Authority prevents cartels, 
authorizes or forbids mergers, and prevents the abuse of a 
dominant market position.
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The Netherlands, in effect, operates a national insurance exchange. The Dutch 
have a choice of plans to join, with open enrollment each year. Initially, in 2006, about 20 
percent of the population changed plans, with this rate settling to about 4 percent a year 
in 2007. The insurance market is highly concentrated: the top four plans account for 90 
percent of enrollment and the top six account for almost all. Most plans provide nation-
wide coverage. About 1.5 percent of the population is uninsured and another 1.5 percent 
default on premiums.19
The Dutch system operates with four key quasi-governmental, independent 
authorities that oversee insurance markets, payments, and quality (Exhibit 10). These 
authorities work with the Dutch Ministry of Health but have independent legislative au-
thority and specific roles within the health system regarding oversight of competition and 
market interactions.
Insurance Market Oversight
Dutch insurers must adhere to the standard benefit package with some limited flexibility 
on the range of deductible and value-based incentives. Benefits include all physician care, 
diagnostic tests, prescription drugs, and hospitalization, with minimal cost-sharing. Acute 
care benefits are supplemented by universal long-term care coverage. Insurers may selec-
tively contract for care with limited networks or institute care arrangements with specific 
providers. As yet, however, selective contracting is rare.20
Insurers are required to charge everyone the same premium for the same benefits. 
Payment for health insurance premiums flows through a combination of flat-rate premi-
ums paid directly to private insurers and income-based contributions paid into a central 
risk-equalization fund.21 A quasi-governmental authority—the Health Care Insurance 
Board—manages the fund, allocating revenues among insurers according to a sophisti-
cated risk-equalization scheme that considers age, sex, health risks, and socioeconomic 
status of the insurer’s population.
The goal of such pooling and risk adjustment is to focus competition on quality 
and value by curbing incentives to profit by avoiding health risks. Such risk equaliza-
tion is a cornerstone of the Dutch managed competition strategy of using insurers as 
prudent purchasers for the population. As illustrated by Exhibit 11, the risk adjustment 
can be substantial—potentially rewarding plans that achieve better outcomes for at-risk 
populations.
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Public comparisons of insurance plans are relatively transparent given the stan-
dardization of benefits, inclusion of essentially all key providers in networks, and require-
ment that insurers charge the same premiums regardless of age or health risks. To date, 
insurers have not yet differentiated themselves on quality or networks. As a result, most 
of the competition has been on price—small premium variations matter.22
The Health Care Insurance Board also plays a role in determining the services 
covered under the standard benefit package. It conducts comparative assessments on 
treatments and services, taking into account necessity, effectiveness, and efficiency. This 
includes assessment of pharmaceuticals and consideration of prices paid by other major 
countries (with a maximum set to the average paid in Germany, France, Belgium, and 
the United Kingdom), with reference pricing for drugs in a similar class. The Insurance 
Board does not itself set policy, but rather provides coverage recommendations to the 
health ministry, which makes the final determination.
Exhibit 11. Dutch Risk-Equalization System: 
Each Adult Pays Premium About 1,050 Euros Annually
 
In Euros per year
Woman, 40, jobless with 
disability income 
allowance, urban region, 
hospitalized last year for 
osteoarthritis
Man, 38, employed, 
prosperous region,
no chronic disease and no 
medication or 
hospitalization last year
Age/gender
Income
Region
Pharmaceutical 
cost group
Diagnostic 
cost group
From Risk Fund
Source: G. Klein Ikkink,  Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport; Presentation to 
AcademyHealth Netherlands Health Study Tour on September 22, 2008, “Reform of the 
Dutch Health Care System.”
€ 934         € 872       
€ 297    
€ 941         
€ 98         
€ 6202        
€ 7800        
−€ 315         −€ 315         
−€ 130         
−€ 63
−€ 67
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Provider Payment
Before 2006, the Dutch system operated with budgets for hospitals and specialized care, 
and uniform payment schedules for ambulatory care. Private insurers shared this starting 
point, with uniform pricing schemes and capitation plus fee-for-visit schedules for prima-
ry care. To improve responsiveness and provide incentives for delivery system reform, re-
forms have been moving toward “freeing up” prices, including development of diagnostic 
treatment groups for hospitals and specialized care. These are similar to diagnosis-related 
groups in the U.S., but may also include bundled payments to cover ambulatory and inpa-
tient care associated with an episode of care. Initially about 10 percent of hospital-based 
and more specialized care was open to negotiation and differential pricing arrangements 
with insurers, increasing to 20 percent in 2008.
By 2009, roughly 30 percent of inpatient spending will be on services negotiated 
between hospitals and insurers—within limits. The Dutch Health Care Authority oversees 
the payment reforms. The Authority also sets price ceilings for pharmaceuticals. Insurers 
may negotiate discounts. Insurers may also introduce incentives and extra payments for 
primary care and chronic disease management innovations.
The Dutch Health Care Authority manages competition between insurers and sets 
the prices and budgets for most health care providers. As payment moves toward negotia-
tions and allows differential arrangements by insurers, the Authority also has the legal 
power to examine the range of payments and set limits based on estimates of “efficient 
payment levels” to avoid abuse of market power, including by dominant hospital or net-
work providers.
The Authority and the Insurance Board each operate with explicit legislative au-
thority and criteria. Both are funded by the Dutch ministry but have their own governance 
structures, giving them a degree of independence and political insulation.
Primary Care and Delivery System
The Dutch health care system is characterized by a strong primary care foundation with 
long-term doctor–patient relationships. All Dutch people register with a primary care 
general practice (GP), which is then responsible for referrals for more specialized care. A 
hallmark of the system includes a series of GP cooperatives that provide the vast majority 
of residents with access to after-hours care without going to the emergency room, includ-
ing home visits as needed.23
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GPs are paid through a mix of fixed capitation rates and fee-for-service (about 
60/40), with maximum prices set by national policy. Targeted payments encourage the 
use of nurses and support telephone and e-mail consultations. Insurers may establish ad-
ditional payment incentives for chronic care management and improving outcomes.
Roughly two-thirds of specialists are hospital-based, self-employed, and paid on 
a capped fee-for-service basis; the remaining ones are salaried. The majority of hospital 
funding is provided through budgets and fixed diagnostic-based prices set by the Health 
Care Authority, with market pricing being gradually introduced.
Information Systems
The Healthcare Inspectorate, a branch of the health ministry, has responsibility for the 
quality of care provided within the health system. The Inspectorate sets quality stan-
dards and metrics for public reporting. To provide transparent quality information for 
benchmarking and incentives to improve, various Dutch institutes collaborate to develop 
and post clinical quality and patient experience information on a public Web site called 
Choose Better (www.kiesbeter.nl) (Exhibit 12).
Exhibit 12. Benchmarking in the Netherlands
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CROSS-CUTTING THEMES: QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES  
AND “RULES OF THE GAME” FOR COMPETITION
As described, the German and Dutch governments assume strong leadership roles in 
their countries’ health care systems. In each country, legislation has established relatively 
independent quasi-governmental authorities focused on insurance markets, payment sys-
tems, and information about quality and effectiveness of care. Each country has moved 
away from direct budget control to stimulate competition and innovation toward improv-
ing care and slowing cost growth. The authorities in each country have also worked to 
achieve coherence in payment incentives.
The quasi-governmental authorities aim to establish rules and provide information 
essential for well-functioning markets. They also seek to facilitate choice, price, payment 
incentives for value, and information flow between the three key parties: patients, provid-
ers, and insurers.
Both countries have developed distinctive arrangements of quasi-governmental 
authorities to provide stewardship in the public interest in the context of multiple, com-
peting insurance plans. These arrangements have been shaped by the unique history and 
structure of their respective national health systems and they continue to evolve.
Although the mechanisms are country-specific, they share common goals, charac-
teristics, and tools that aim to focus competition on better access, quality, and cost perfor-
mance. As examples of strategic governance approaches with similar goals, the two coun-
tries offer important insights for structure and oversight of the implementation of health 
reform in the United States.
Core Values and Design Principles
Common principles and core values guide the authorities in Germany and the Netherlands 
and instruct oversight and the direction of their reforms. These principles and values, and 
their corresponding constraints, derive from the broad-based public consensus embodied 
in national legislation.
Guarding public interest•	 . The authorities are mission-driven organizations that 
aim to promote health by ensuring access and quality of health care for the coun-
tries’ residents.
Independence•	 . The authorities are granted varying levels of independence from 
political pressure, yet remain accountable.
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Participatory•	 . Decision and advice processes include stakeholder perspectives, 
either through formal governance arrangements or standing committees.
Boundaries•	 . The authorities or institutes operate with explicit criteria and limits.
Checks and balances•	 . To ensure that decisions and advice are relevant and evi-
dence-based, the design of authorities includes internal and external processes of 
checks and balances. These include quality assurance protocols.
Transparency•	 . The authorities must justify their decisions or advice. In each coun-
try, mechanisms have been established to ensure that rationales and underlying 
data and evidence are available to the public.24
Expediency•	 . To ensure that decision-making is timely and relevant, authorities 
have processes to expedite their actions.
Flexibility•	 . The authorities are designed and positioned to operate with flexibility. 
They generally have hiring authority and functioning autonomy.
Continuity and predictability•	 . In both Germany and the Netherlands, there is an 
expectation that the authorities will use protocols for decision-making that incor-
porate the aforementioned attributes to produce coherent policy over time. This 
ensures greater predictability of the decision-making processes.
Key Insurance Market and Health System Functions
The quasi-governmental authorities in Germany and the Netherlands are responsible for 
decision-making and issuing guidance on a variety of key health policy areas. Efforts to 
enhance value and foster delivery system changes and competition in the public interest 
focus on three key areas: insurance market rules and oversight; payment and pricing; and 
quality information systems, including comparative effectiveness research.
Effective	and	Fair	Competition	in	Insurance	Markets:	Benefits	and	Risk	Adjustment
Both Germany and the Netherlands operate their insurance markets with similar rules 
and oversight to ensure that competition among insurers focuses on outcomes and costs 
and is fair. The rules and standards emphasize access and financial protection and provide 
safeguards to protect patients and families who are vulnerable due to poor health or low 
levels of incomes or education.
Benefits. The two countries each have a transparent process to define a minimum 
benefit package and scope of coverage. This includes parameters for cost-sharing to pro-
vide financial protection and encourage effective, essential care. Such standardization 
facilitates comparison of plans.
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Both countries operate with a uniform national benefit package that defines the 
scope of their “statutory” (i.e., legislated minimum) insurance system. Determining 
which services to include and exclude can be very politically sensitive. Both countries 
use sophisticated, evidence-based assessments when changing or expanding benefits. 
These assessments also may guide cost-sharing variations.
In Germany, the health ministry delegates the specifics of benefit package de-
sign and coverage decisions. The Federal Joint Committee and its members (payers and 
providers) determine the standard benefit basket for statutory health insurance, basing 
changes largely on research and recommendations from IQWiG.25 The Joint Committee 
also issues recommendations on disease management programs, using nationally and in-
ternationally recognized evidence-based guidelines.26
The Dutch Health Care Insurance Board advises the health ministry on the stan-
dard benefit package and whether to include or exclude specific benefits. The health min-
istry then makes the final decisions. The Insurance Board is responsible for clarifying the 
contents, boundaries, and limitations of the benefit package.27
Risk adjustment. Risk adjustment through a Health Fund (Germany) and Risk 
Equalization Fund (the Netherlands) is central to structuring competitive health insurance 
markets. Each uses a combination of competing payers, budgets, and public oversight 
over payment policies to get better quality and slow cost growth. Both countries use cen-
tralized risk adjustment to compensate plans that enroll sicker populations and to create 
incentives for payers to compete on quality and efficiency rather than enrollee selection.
In effect, both countries operate national insurance exchanges in which the popu-
lation has a choice of insurance plans, with the ability to compare performance, reputa-
tion, and premiums. Limited variation in benefits and prohibition against underwriting 
also reduces insurance administrative overhead.
Risk-adjustment mechanisms benefit from access to historical claims data for all 
payers for the entire German and Dutch populations. The central funds also provide le-
verage in determining the overall budget for the health system.28
Payment Policies
Each country seeks cohesion in payment policies: payment and pricing policies are not 
left to individual insurers acting alone. In Germany, these are largely determined by “all-
payer” negotiations each year. In the Netherlands, cohesion is achieved through a set of 
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shared payment policies with negotiations at the margins. In both countries, competition 
and collaboration across insurers enables the kind of coherence in prices and incentives 
for providers that rarely exists in the United States outside of fully integrated care systems.
In Germany, the Ministry of Health sets general rules about health care market 
competition. Benefit package decisions and payment policies rest with the self-governing 
Federal Joint Committee, with representatives from the associations of sickness funds, 
hospitals, and providers. For physicians, the Joint Committee annually negotiates aggre-
gate payments. As of 2009, these will be made more flexible and take population health 
risks into account.
The Joint Committee also sets reference prices and policies for prescription 
drugs, for which it consults the independent research entity, IQWiG. The 2004 reform 
that established the Federal Joint Committee also allows individual sickness funds to 
negotiate rebates with pharmaceutical companies, contract providers directly, and procure 
medical aids.29
In the Netherlands, the Health Care Authority manages competition among insur-
ers and sets capitation rates and price ceilings for most health care providers’ services and 
drugs. Insurers are free to negotiate lower prices with providers, except for certain ser-
vices. The Health Care Authority also has the role of regulating insurers’ marketing and, 
along with the Dutch Competition Authority, oversees the extent of competition in health 
care markets.30,31
Quality: Comparative Effectiveness
Both countries use comparative effectiveness as an integral tool to improve quality and 
efficiency. The comparative effectiveness authority in both countries plays an advisory 
role to the authority that makes benefit package decisions, thereby maintaining a separa-
tion between the scientific and political domains. In making recommendations, the com-
parative effectiveness authorities take clinical- and cost-effectiveness into account.
In Germany, IQWiG provides a structured assessment of the evidence on the 
comparative clinical- and cost-effectiveness of different medical interventions. Like the 
Dutch Health Care Insurance Board, IQWiG plays an advisory role and transmits its as-
sessment to the national decision-making body, the Federal Joint Committee.32 IQWiG is 
a free-standing entity with its own source of funding. It maintains greater distance from 
the government than the Dutch Insurance Board, which receives governmental funding 
and has certain ministerial obligations. IQWiG’s organizational distance is considered to 
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be critical in sustaining the long-term credibility of using comparative clinical- and cost-
effectiveness research in national policymaking.
As part of its responsibility for benefit design, the Dutch Health Care Insurance 
Board also serves as the comparative effectiveness entity. The Insurance Board is respon-
sible for assessing new technologies, for which it considers both clinical- and cost-effec-
tiveness data. Following its assessment, the Insurance Board makes a recommendation to 
the health ministry about whether a health technology should be included or excluded.33
Quality: Protection, Transparency, and Information
Strong quality controls and reporting are essential components of a robust health system 
and well-functioning markets. Setting and tracking standards of care makes provider and 
system performance transparent and creates the information infrastructure necessary for 
improvement. Both countries see quality assurance as a critical element in directing com-
peting payers and providers toward the public good.
In Germany, the Federal Agency for Quality Assurance, which is managed by the 
Joint Committee and the Federal Ministry of Health, is responsible for establishing hos-
pital quality indicators and benchmarks, collecting data from all German hospitals, and 
providing active feedback. This feedback includes engaging in structured dialogues with 
poor performers to provide assistance to improve. In the future, the Agency for Quality 
Assurance will also focus on ambulatory care.34
The Joint Committee also carries out a range of quality assurance responsibilities. 
It issues directives governing quality assurance in the ambulatory and hospital sectors and 
is responsible for ensuring transparency about the quality of care.35, 36
In the Netherlands, the Health Care Inspectorate is responsible for supervising 
the quality of care. The Inspectorate sets quality standards and ensures those standards 
are met. It operates independently but reports to the health ministry when requested. 
The Inspectorate hosts national steering committees composed of patients, providers, 
and insurers that contribute to the review, development, and selection of quality met-
rics for public reporting.37 Information about provider performance is published on a 
government-sponsored Web site (www.kiesbeter.nl).38 In addition, the Dutch Health Care 
Authority has a general obligation to ensure transparency requirements are met as a part 
of quality control.39
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How Decisions Are Coordinated
A common feature of the governance structures in Germany and the Netherlands is a 
three-part framework in which the population, insurers, and providers are decision-mak-
ers, with some degree of government oversight. Both countries have designed their quasi-
governmental authorities to be accountable and have made efforts to ensure participation 
and coordination, as follows:
The German Joint Committee is organized as a self-governance body with rep-
resentation from providers, payers, and patients. The Committee’s mandate is to translate 
the legal framework set by Parliament into binding implementation directives. Given its 
comprehensive, quasi-legislative responsibilities, the Committee is often referred to as 
the “little lawmaker.” Its decisions are binding for payers and providers.
Neither the Parliament nor the Federal Ministry of Health approves Joint 
Committee regulations, although it is subject to legal review by the Ministry. 
Functionally, all policy directives issued by the Joint Committee must be submitted to  
the Ministry for approval. The Ministry must respond within two months if there are  
any objections.
On a day-to-day basis, the Joint Committee works closely with IQWiG by re-
questing assessments of the best available evidence on health technologies.40 IQWiG’s 
recommendations can be appealed by relevant stakeholders. In addition, the Joint 
Committee is not required to accept IQWiG’s recommendations. In cases where it does 
not follow IQWiG’s advice, the Committee is expected to explain its rationale.41
The Dutch Insurance Board and Health Authority each have a series of legally 
mandated tasks, some advisory and some regulatory. Both entities receive broad super-
vision from the Dutch Ministry while also maintaining a level of independence. These 
entities are designed to be sheltered from the various health care interests, and as a result, 
serve as safe havens for difficult or complex decisions. The Ministry is, in many respects, 
both a client of the Insurance Board and Authority and a decision-maker.42
In both countries, each of the authorities operates under specific legislation from 
Parliament and is accountable for its performance. Together, they oversee competing in-
surance plans and facilitate payment incentives to encourage more effective and efficient 
delivery systems. The system of checks and balances aims to enable decision-making and 
incremental coverage, payment, and information system reforms with broad goals and ac-
countability for the total cost and performance of the health care system. The authorities 
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within and across the two countries differ in funding sources and structure. For details see 
Appendix B.
IMPLICATIONS AND RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES
The idea of using quasi-governmental authorities with varying degrees of independence 
from governmental authorities to make specific health insurance, payment, and policy 
decisions is not a new concept in the United States. In recent years, Congress and the 
President have increasingly used hybrid, quasi-governmental entities with public and 
private characteristics to implement public policy functions that traditionally have been 
the responsibility of executive agencies and departments.43 Recently, the Senate Finance 
Committee and a number of health experts have discussed the possibility of establishing 
a health care market oversight entity similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve Board or creat-
ing a new Council on Payment Reform.44 As an independent federal agency, the Federal 
Reserve implements monetary policy and oversees certain financial institutions and ac-
tivities.45 The establishment of a new payment council would change the role of the cur-
rent Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) to oversee Medicare payment 
policies and implement all-payer reforms.46
Current U.S. national reform proposals include multiple policies that aim to 
improve the way insurance markets work, provide better information, and reform 
payment policies to moderate cost increases while maintaining or improving quality. 
Leading proposals in both the Senate and the House of Representatives include insurance 
exchanges with insurance market reforms. The Senate includes the creation of a new 
commission with authority to recommend payment reforms to address Medicare long-
term cost concerns.47
Further, Congress is considering the governance structure for a major expansion 
of comparative effectiveness research. In 1995, the future of the Agency for Health 
Care Policy and Research was threatened, following its issuance of guidelines for 
low back pain48. With this in mind, proposals have been advanced to provide greater 
insulation to the entity responsible for developing recommendations based on 
comparative effectiveness research. These proposed reforms are designed to ensure 
that the entity overseeing comparative effectiveness research has independent expertise 
and the authority to coordinate with other key health agencies. Toward this end, the 
recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 established a 
Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research comprised of 
representatives from federal agencies to coordinate comparative effectiveness research.49 
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All three national reform proposals would strengthen this research capacity and expand 
the national capacity for quality reporting and benchmarking.
States also have established relatively independent quasi-governmental entities 
to oversee their health care markets. For example, the Massachusetts Commonwealth 
Health Insurance Connector Authority, also referred to as the Health Connector, is an in-
dependent state agency established under the landmark Massachusetts health care reform 
of 2006. The Connector is governed by a board composed of public and private repre-
sentatives. It is charged with developing key elements of health insurance policy (e.g., 
minimum coverage and affordability standards) under a broad framework outlined in the 
health reform law, as well as operating the state insurance exchange.50
With insurance exchanges playing a central role in national reform proposals, the 
examples of Massachusetts, Germany, and the Netherlands provide experiences that can 
inform implementation of exchanges in the United States. These evolving experiences 
provide insight on effective oversight authority to improve the accessibility, affordability, 
and efficiency of insurance markets.
As the United States considers health care reform options and mechanisms to 
oversee implementation, the German and Dutch use of relatively independent quasi-gov-
ernmental authorities to oversee key policy decisions offer real-world examples for how 
to blend government control, stakeholder input, and transparency to achieve public goals. 
In addition to overseeing insurance markets, the authorities perform a number of impor-
tant coordinating, regulatory, and advisory roles that together address access, quality, and 
cost. The key strategic roles include:
Insurance exchange with benefit standards: Pooling and redistributing revenue to • 
insurance companies through a risk-adjustment scheme to encourage competition 
on costs and quality, rather than enrollee selection.
Multipayer payment policies: Providing mechanisms to ensure payment • 
coherence and group purchasing power, within total spending targets.
Comparative effectiveness: Using comparative effectiveness to inform value-• 
based benefit design and pricing to improve quality and efficiency. Using 
provisions to ensure that scientific assessment is kept separate from benefit and 
pricing decisions.
Transparent, public information systems and feedback: Building an information • 
infrastructure to assess both quality and costs, with benchmarks to improve.
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Market regulation and oversight: Using effective regulation and oversight to • 
guard against the abuse of market power by insurers or providers.
In sum, these two countries provide important examples for how relatively in-
dependent authorities can work together to balance diverse stakeholder interests and to 
engage in effective, efficient, structured, and transparent decision-making under broad 
national health care reform principles.
While the specific governance approaches within Germany and the Netherlands 
reflect their unique health systems and are evolving, they serve as potential conceptual 
models for new national leadership capacity within the United States. In particular, the 
German and Dutch approach to their multipayer insurance systems suggest ways to move 
away from fragmented risk pools and complex pricing—where prices bear little or no 
relationship to cost or value. As one health policy expert notes, pricing of U.S. hospital 
services might best be characterized as “chaos behind a veil of secrecy.” That is, the price 
paid by the same private insurer to different providers can vary widely for the same ser-
vice, and providers can bill different insurers different fees for the same service.51
The chaos extends to the experience of patients and providers who confront a 
mixture of competition, complexity, and contention in U.S. markets—typically with little 
information on either quality or price. Insurance companies can profit more by attracting 
a marginally healthier mix of enrollees through subtle variations in benefit design that 
discriminate on risk than by payment or system innovation. The complex variations in-
surers use to differentiate themselves in the marketplace are absorbing hours of clinician 
time and driving up administrative costs for physician practices and hospitals.52
Elements of the German and Dutch approaches offer rich examples that, if tai-
lored to unique U.S. institutions, could work in the United States. These include: insur-
ance boards and exchanges to handle risk, set standards, and facilitate meaningful choice; 
all-payer payment mechanisms that ensure coherence and prevent undue use of market 
power; and information systems that inform payment and provide benchmarks to improve 
overall system performance. Just as the German and Dutch governance approaches have 
evolved within unique historical and cultural contexts, moving forward in the U.S. will 
reflect our own unique starting point and key concerns. Yet, these core elements are likely 
central to harnessing U.S. markets for the public interest in an accessible, high-quality, 
affordable, and dynamic U.S. health system.
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APPENDIX A. NATIONAL HEALTH SPENDING,  
USE AND HEALTH OUTCOMES
Exhibit 1. Health Expenditures and Use in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States
Germany Netherlands U.S.
Population, 2007 Total Population (Millions of People) 82.3 16.4 301.6
Percentage of Population Age 65 and Older 20.2% 14.6% 12.6%
Percentage of the Population Without 
Health Insurance
0.5% 1.5% 16.0%
Spending, 2007 Health Care Spending per Capitac $3,588 $3,837 $7,290
Percentage GDP Spent on Health Care 10.4% 9.8% 16.0%
Spending on Health Insurance 
Administration per Capitac
$191 $198 $516
Percentage of Total Health Care Spending 
on Health Insrance Administration
6.0% 5.6% 7.4%
Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending per 
Capitac
$470 $213 $890
Spending on Pharmaceuticals per Capitac $542 $422 $878
Resources & Use, 
2007
Number of Practicing Physicians per 1,000 
Population
3.5 3.9 2.4
Average Annual Number of Physician Visits 
per Capita
7.5 5.7 3.8a
Number of Acute Care Hospital Beds per 
1,000 Population
5.7 3.0 2.7a
Hospital Discharge per 1,000 Population 227 109 126a
Hospital Spending per Dischargec $4,527 $11,988 $17,206a
Average Length of Stay for Acute Care 7.8 6.6a 5.5
MRIs per Million Population 8.2 6.6b 25.9
Physicians’ Use of EMRs (% of Primary 
Care Physicians), 2006d
42% 98% 28%
Source: OECD Health Data 2009 (June 09) unless otherwise noted.
a 2006
b 2005
c USD purchasing power parity (PPP), adjusted for differences in the cost of living.
d Source: Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey of Primary Care Physicians, 2006.
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Exhibit 2. Health and Health Care in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States
Germany Netherlands U.S.
Mortality
Life Expectancy at Age 65 or Older: Female, 
2005
20.1 20 19.5
Life Expectancy at Age 65 or Older:  
Male, 2005
16.9 16.4 17
Mortality Amenable to Health Care (Deaths 
per 100,000 Population), 2002-03c
90 82 110
Infant Mortality (Deaths per 1,000 Live 
Births), 2006
3.8 4.4 5.0
Deaths per 
100,000, 2005
Due to Acute Myocardial Infarction 46.3 41.0 45.3
Due to Malignant Neoplasms 159.3 180.8 157.9
Due to Diabetes Mellitus 16.2 15.8 20.3
Due to Bronchitis, Asthma, and Emphysema 3.4 4.6 3.1
Potential Years 
of Life Lost, 
2005
Due to Acute Myocardial Infarction 159 138 129
Due to Malignant Neoplasms 850 927 841
Due to Diabetes Mellitus 39 41 99
Due to Bronchitis, Asthma, and Emphysema 15 11 20
Health Risk 
Factors, 2005
Percentage of Adults Who Report Being 
Daily Smokers
23.2% 31.0% 24.0%
Obesity (BMI>30) Prevalence 13.6% 10.7% 23.0%
Source: OECD Health Data 2009 (June 09) unless otherwise noted.
a 2006
b 2005
c Countries’ age-standardized death rates before age 75; includes ischemic heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and bacterial infections.  
Data: E. Nolte and C. M. McKee, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine analysis of World Health Organization (WHO) mortality files (Nolte and McKee).
Source: E. Nolte, C.M. McKee, “Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an Earlier Analysis”, Health Affairs, January/February 2008, 27(1):58–71.
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APPENDIX B. GERMAN AND DUTCH HEALTH SYSTEM AUTHORITY 
ORGANIzATIONAL DETAILS
The following provide further details about the German and Dutch Authorities.
What roles do quasi-governmental authorities play?
The roles of quasi-governmental authorities can be classified into one of three categories: 
regulatory, advisory, or hybrid (a mix of regulatory and advisory).1
Regulatory•	 : The German Federal Joint Committee is the main decision-making 
body in German health care, issuing binding directives about quality assurance 
and making decisions about the benefit package and coverage levels.2
Advisory•	 : The German IQWiG plays a strictly advisory role. German policymak-
ers established IQWiG based on a need for an independent “standard-identifying” 
(rather than “standard-setting”) entity to provide recommendations to the Federal 
Joint Committee on the coverage of medical technologies.3 
Hybrid•	 : The Dutch Health Care Insurance Board and the Health Care Authority 
carry out a blend of advisory and regulatory functions. The Dutch Insurance 
Board advises the Ministry of Health on the comprehensive benefit package and 
what should be included or excluded. It also provides ex ante guidance on data 
transparency and privacy standards and ex poste regulation of health plans to en-
sure they are adhering to those standards.4 The Health Care Authority provides ex 
ante regulation of dominant market positions while playing an advisory role in 
merger control.5
Where are quasi-governmental authorities positioned within the health care system?
The placement of quasi-governmental authorities within the German and Dutch health 
care systems can be described on a linear spectrum based on the authority’s proximity to 
or distance from the Ministry of Health.6 In both countries the Ministry is a cabinet-level 
position. The following illustrates examples of models of different relationships.
1  A. Boer. (Feb. 4, 2009) Quasi	Governmental	Organization	in	Health	Care	Governance.
2  German Federal Joint Committee Website: http://www.g-ba.de/institution/sys/english/. 
Accessed: Feb. 4, 2009.
3  M. Nasser, “Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care: Germany,” July 2009. 
4  A. Boer. (Feb. 4, 2009) Quasi	Governmental	Organization	in	Health	Care	Governance.
5  M. Mikkers. (Sept. 25, 2008) Health	Care	Reforms	in	the	Netherlands. 
6  Adapted from CRS approach to classifying entities within the U.S. quasi-government.
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The German Federal Joint Committee is a national authority with the power to im-•	
plement policies and issue binding decisions for payers and providers. It is under 
legal review of the health ministry but is not a subordinate authority. Functionally, 
all policy directives issued by the Joint Committee must be submitted to the min-
istry for approval. The ministry can veto Joint Committee regulations, but this has 
never happened since its establishment in 2004. The Joint Committee is composed 
of stakeholders—sickness funds, providers, and patients—who are subsequently 
responsible for overseeing implementation and compliance with directives within 
their own associations.7 
The German comparative effectiveness institute, IQWiG, is constituted as a non-•	
governmental, freestanding research entity with its own funding stream, estab-
lished and overseen by the Federal Joint Committee as an independent scientific 
organization (or “decision-support tool”). Positioning IQWiG apart from the 
Ministry of Health and the Joint Committee was the outcome of a year-long de-
bate over how to distance this organization from political influence and potential 
conflicts of interest, which is seen as essential to maintain credibility. 8
The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate is structured as an agency attached to the •	
Ministry of Health, providing oversight of quality assurance. 
The Dutch Health Care Authority and Health Care Insurance Board are both rela-•	
tively independent, quasi-governmental authorities—independent, in that they 
have their own governance structures and hiring authority; quasi-governmental, in 
that their funding comes through the Ministry of Health, and they have an obliga-
tion to oversee certain policy areas and report to the Minister on specific topics. 
How are quasi-governmental authorities organized and financed?
The German Federal Joint Committee comprises 13 members, plus an impartial •	
chairman and two impartial members coming from the payer or provider commu-
nities. Providers and sickness funds are each represented by five members. Patient 
representatives also participate but cannot vote. Instead, they can file proposals 
and participate in Joint Committee consultations.9 
7  The Federal Joint Committee–About	Us. http://www.g-ba.de/downloads/17-98-2507/2007-12-
20-Flyer_GBA_engl.pdf. Accessed: Feb. 22, 2009.
8  S. Schlette. E-mail March 14, 2009. 
9  Ibid. 
34
The German IQWiG has a 30-member Board of Trustees, a Scientific Advisory •	
Board, and a Steering Committee made up of IQWiG’s management, including 
the heads of its eight departments. Both IQWiG and the Federal Joint Committee 
have a dedicated funding stream through a levy on every hospital case and a tax 
on ambulatory and outpatient services.10 
The Dutch Health Care Authority is led by a three-member Executive Board. •	
While the health ministry has political responsibility for the Health Care Authority 
and can issue general instructions, there is a clear separation of functions between 
policy and supervision. The Health Care Authority’s budget is established by the 
health ministry.11
The Dutch Health Care Insurance Board is led by a three-member Executive •	
Board under the stewardship of the health ministry as well as an advisory board. 
As with the Health Care Authority, the budget of the Insurance Board is estab-
lished by the health ministry.12
10  German Federal Joint Committee Website: http://www.g-ba.de/institution/auftrag/finan-
zierung/; Accessed June 5, 2009. K. Chalkidou and G. Anderson, Comparative Effectiveness, 
July 2009. 
11  M. Mikkers. (Sept. 25, 2008) Health	Care	Reforms	in	the	Netherlands.
12  A. Boer, Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ). (Sept. 24, 2008) Taking	Care	of	Health	
Care. Presented at AcademyHealth Netherlands Health Study Tour. 
